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ABSTRACT 
 
We examine the effects of the concurrent provision of audit and non-audit services on auditor independence using 
earnings persistence, which is one of the qualitative properties of earnings, as well as related market responses. 
Empirical results are as follows. First, the accruals persistence of the group that is concurrently provided audit and 
non-audit services in many cases is shown to be lower than that of the group that is not concurrently provided audit 
and non-audit services. Second, the phenomenon of low accruals persistence of the group that is concurrently provided 
a lot of audit and non-audit services is shown to be overestimated in the market. This study contributes to existing 
research in three main respects. First, from the viewpoint of earnings persistence, it is verified that rather than whether 
non-audit services are provided or not, the level of non-audit services acts as an important factor in determining 
damage to auditor independence by the concurrent provision of audit and non-audit services. Second, in relation to 
market rationality, whether the market appropriately reflects changes in the persistence of earnings and accruals 
according to whether non-audit services are provided or not is analyzed. Third, through additional analysis, it is 
verified that differences in the persistence of earnings and accruals among groups that are concurrently provided 
audit and non-audit services vary with the audit environment. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
uditor independence is essential in enhancing the reliability and transparency of accounting 
information. As a result of recent window dressing settlement cases involving GS Engineering & 
Construction Corp., STX, Dong-yang, and Hyosung reported in the press, interest in the reliability 
of financial statements has been rising among stakeholders. Meanwhile, to enhance auditor independence, South 
Korea amended the Certified Public Accountant Act in 2003 to prevent auditors from providing non-audit services or 
only allow the provision of some non-audit services after approval by an audit committee. The position of regulators 
regarding this matter is that the concurrent provision of audit and non-audit services will damage independence, 
thereby impairing the reliability of accounting information. However, according to theories that advocate the 
concurrent provision of audit and non-audit services, performing two tasks simultaneously will enable more in-depth 
performance of audit work, maintaining or rather reinforcing the independence of the auditor. In existing studies, the 
relationship between the concurrent provision of audit and non-audit services and auditor independence has been a 
persisting study subject in the field of accounting/auditing, and two conflicting views exist with regard to the 
relationship1. The first, auditors that concurrently provide audit and non-audit services suffer larger economic losses 
in cases of corporate adhesion or auditor replacement than those that do not. Therefore, auditors that concurrently 
provide audit and non-audit services cannot freely express audit-related independent opinions (Frankel et al., 2002). 
The second, it means that since auditors that concurrently provide audit and non-audit services better understand the 
																																								 																				
1 DeFond et al. (2002) interpreted auditor independence as the ability of auditors to express their audit opinions objectively without being affected 
by client pressure or self-audit risk. 
A 
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clients' management and internal control environments than those that do not, they can improve inefficiencies and 
perform more in-depth audits.  
 
Recently, audit markets have reached a critical situation due to intensifying competition among auditors in which even 
dumping sales at fees below costs are made. To make up for audit work contracted through dumping sales, auditors 
sometimes make bundle contracts for audit and non-audit services as a package. In such cases, the auditor may be 
subordinate to the client for economic reasons, damaging the independence of the auditor. When the independence of 
the auditor has been damaged, opportunistic actions of managers, such as earnings management, may be left 
unattended, and this situation may reduce the predictive value of earnings, which is a key element showing the 
relevance of financial information. Jonas and Blanchet (2000) presented earnings persistence, an element to measure 
the predictive value of earnings from the viewpoint of information users. Therefore, in our study, the relationship 
between the concurrent provision of audit and non-audit services and earnings persistence was judged to represent a 
measure to shed new light on auditor independence, and auditor independence was investigated from the viewpoint 
of the qualitative properties of earnings. 
 
The purpose of our study is to examine the effects of the concurrent provision of audit and non-audit services on 
auditor independence using earnings persistence, one of the qualitative properties of earnings, as well as related market 
responses. 
 
In the case of accounting firms in South Korea, since audit departments and non-audit departments are separated from 
each other, concurrent provision of audit and non-audit services may not affect auditor independence (Gwon et al., 
2004). However, if audit services become a loss leader for non-audit services, the relevant auditors will have a motive 
to compensate for the low audit fees by using non-audit services, and will not be willing to bear costs for auditor 
replacement due to the low audit fees (Jeong et al., 2009). Therefore, the independence of the auditor may be damaged 
more in cases where the ratio of non-audit services fees to audit fees is higher. Based on this expectation, in our study, 
samples will be divided into the following groups: audit and non-audit services are not concurrently provided (NG); 
audit and non-audit services are concurrently provided in a few cases (SG); and audit and non-audit services are 
concurrently provided in many cases (LG) 2. Differences in the persistence of earnings and accruals among the groups 
and market responses by group will be examined. If auditor independence is damaged by the provision of non-audit 
services according to the level of the provision, the predictive value of earnings of the group that is concurrently 
provided audit and non-audit services in a few cases or in many cases should be lower than that of the group that is 
not concurrently provided audit and non-audit services, and consequently the persistence of earnings and accruals will 
also decline. On the other hand, if damage to auditor independence has nothing to do with economic dependence of 
clients, differences in the persistence of earnings and accruals will not appear among the divided groups. 
 
The empirical results of our study are as follows. First, the accruals persistence of the group that is concurrently 
provided audit and non-audit services in many cases is shown to be lower than that of the group that is not concurrently 
provided audit and non-audit services. This seems to suggest that rather than whether non-audit services are provided 
or not, it is the level of non-audit services that affect auditor independence, meaning that the phenomenon of damage 
to auditor independence by the concurrent provision of audit and non-audit services occurs only in cases where the 
level of non-audit services is high. Second, the phenomenon of low accruals persistence for the group that is 
concurrently provided audit and non-audit services is shown to be overestimated in the market. This suggests that 
when the level of non-audit services is high, market participants do not appropriately evaluate the persistence of 
accruals. Third, in audit environments, losses due to audit failure, such as those due to class actions, are shown to be 
put before losses due to the drop in auditor reputation. 
 
This study contributes to existing research in three main respects. First, from the viewpoint of earnings persistence, it 
is verified that rather than whether non-audit services are provided or not, the level of non-audit services acts as an 
important factor in determining damage to the independence of the auditor by the concurrent provision of audit and 
non-audit services. Second, in relation to market rationality, whether the market appropriately reflects changes in the 
																																								 																				
2 Refers to cases where the same auditor provides audit services and non-audit services simultaneously. 
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persistence of earnings and accruals according to whether non-audit services provided or not is analyzed. Third, 
through additional analysis, it is verified that differences in the persistence of earnings and accruals among groups 
that are concurrently provided audit and non-audit services vary with the audit environment. Finally, our study is 
expected to provide additional information at this point, where consistent study results regarding damage to auditor 
independence and the knowledge transfer phenomena according to the concurrent provision of audit and non-audit 
services have not been reported. In addition, our study is expected to provide information useful in determining 
differentiated supervision level according to the level of concurrent provision of audit and non-audit services.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and develops the testable 
hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the research design. Section 4 presents the empirical results of the study. Finally, 
section 5 concludes the study. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Literature on Auditor Independence 
 
Recently, whether the concurrent provision of audit and non-audit services causes damage to auditor independence by 
increasing economic dependence on clients has been a persisting study subject. Previous studies related to damage to 
auditor independence are as follows. First, Dee et al. (2002) and Frankel et al. (2002) examined the relationship 
between the provision of non-audit services and auditor independence centering on discretionary accruals. Based on 
the results of these studies, the researchers reported a significant positive (+) relationship between the ratio of non-
audit fees to audit fees and discretionary accruals, and suggested that in the case of samples with high ratios of non-
audit services, earnings higher than values predicted by financial analysts were being reported. Swanger and Chewning 
(2001) conducted a questionnaire survey about auditor independence on financial analysts, and based on the results, 
they identified that financial analysts felt that auditor independence was damaged when a company's internal audit 
work was commissioned to external auditors. 
 
Kim et al. (2008) discovered that financial statements become less conservative as both abnormal audit and non-audit 
fees increase. In addition, the level of audit and non-audit fees is also negatively associated with the degree of 
conservatism. These results suggest that higher level of both audit and non-audit fees could impair financial reporting 
quality. Jung et al. (2009) showed that non-audit services rendered concurrently with audit services impair auditor 
independence. However, they found no evidence that the ratio of non-audit services fees to audit services fees impairs 
auditor independence. Kim et al. (2010) examined the association between economic dependence from non-audit 
services and auditor independence measured as the review opinion of internal control and the disclosure of internal 
control weaknesses. The first result shows that economic fee dependence is not significantly related to qualified review 
opinion. On the other hand, the second result shows that economic fee dependence significantly affects the disclosure 
of internal control system weakness. Choi (2011) showed that the provision of non-audit services has a significant 
negative (-) effect on accrual quality. In particular, among non-audit services, only tax services have a significant 
negative (-) effect on accrual quality. 
 
DeFond et al. (2002) examined the relationship between the provision of non-audit services and auditor independence, 
centering on audit opinions on going concerns. The results of the study indicated that non-audit services were not 
related to audit opinions. On the contrary, audit fees of firms that received going concern uncertainty opinions were 
shown to be higher. 
 
Ghosh et al. (2009) investigated how investors recognized non-audit fees in terms of auditor independence through 
analysis of the relationship between non-audit fees and earnings response coefficients (ERC). The results of the study 
indicated that the ratio of non-audit fees to entire fees had no statistically significant relationship with auditor 
independence, and that the importance of businesses and earnings response coefficients (ERC) had negative (-) 
relationships. The results of these previous studies present an opinion that the provision of non-audit services does not 
damage auditor independence. Conflicting studies, analyzing the relationship between the concurrent provision of 
audit and non-audit services, and auditor independence mentioned earlier, investigated the relationship using diverse 
methods. When seen comprehensively, the study results are not consistent, as sample companies, non-audit service 
fees, and proxies of auditor independence differed by researcher. 
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2.2 Hypotheses Development 
 
2.2.1 Non-Audit Services Group and Earnings and Accruals Persistence 
 
Recently, audit markets have reached a critical situation due to intensifying competition among auditors in which even 
dumping sales at fees below costs are made. To make up for audit work contracted through dumping sales, auditors 
sometimes create bundle contracts for audit and non-audit services as a package. Auditors that concurrently provide 
audit and non-audit services suffer larger economic losses in cases of corporate adhesion or auditor replacement than 
those that do not. Therefore, auditors that concurrently provide audit and non-audit services cannot freely express 
audit-related independent opinions (Frankel et al. 2002). According to the results of a study conducted by Frankel et 
al. (2002), since the phenomenon of damage to auditor independence may be determined by the level of economic 
dependence on clients (amount of non-audit services fees), it may be intensified as the amount of non-audit services 
increases.  
 
The practical opinion also exists believing that auditors that concurrently provide audit and non-audit services can 
perform a more in-depth audit because they better understand their clients' management and internal control 
environments, that auditor independence may be maintained or reinforced thanks to the knowledge transfer 
phenomenon, and that audit departments and non-audit departments are separated from each other in accounting firms, 
so the concurrent provision of audit and non-audit services should not greatly damage auditor independence. 
Therefore, damage to auditor independence may not be related to economic dependence on clients. Jonas and Blanchet 
(2000) presented earnings persistence as an element of measurement of predictive values of earnings from the 
viewpoint of information users. Net incomes can be divided into accruals and cash flows, and accruals can play a more 
important role in improving profit-making ability as a performance measure than cash flows, which are time-specific 
and have limitations in matching (Dechow, 1994). Therefore, accruals persistence can also be an element of 
measurement of the predictive value of earnings.   
 
When auditor independence has been damaged, opportunistic actions of managers, such as earnings management, may 
be left unattended, and this situation may reduce the predictive value of earnings, which is a key element showing the 
relevance of financial information. If auditor independence is damaged by the provision of non-audit services 
according to the level of the provision, the predictive value of earnings of the group that is concurrently provided audit 
and non-audit services in a few cases or in many cases should be lower than that of the group that is not concurrently 
provided audit and non-audit services, and the persistence of earnings and accruals will also decline consequently. On 
the other hand, if damage to auditor independence has nothing to do with economic dependence on clients, differences 
in the persistence of earnings and accruals will not appear among the divided groups. Based on these conflicting views, 
we propose the following two null hypotheses: 
 
H1: There should be no difference in earnings persistence among the group that is not concurrently provided audit and 
non-audit services (NG), the group that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit services in a few cases (SG), and 
the group that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit services in many cases (LG).  
 
H2: There should be no difference in accruals persistence among the group that is not concurrently provided audit and 
non-audit services (NG), the group that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit services in a few cases (SG), and 
the group that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit services in many cases (LG).  
 
2.2.2 Non-Audit Services Group and Market Pricing 
 
According to the efficient market hypothesis, since market participants can utilize all information, their subjective 
probability distribution and objective probability distribution for evaluation of an economic phenomenon or variable 
become the same. In addition, market participants appropriately recognize differences in the persistence of earnings 
or accruals and reflect this recognition on investment activities. On the other hand, some previous studies, such as 
Sloan (1996), present market anomalies indicating that market participants cannot reflect accruals persistence on 
expected amounts of earnings. These market anomalies are considered attributable to the fact that market participants 
cannot accurately understand information on earnings persistence due to the functional fixation hypothesis about 
earnings. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – November/December 2016 Volume 32, Number 6 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1589 The Clute Institute 
According to the efficient market hypothesis, if the persistence of earnings and accruals is changed based on whether 
non-audit services are provided or not, or the level of the non-audit services provided, the change will be appropriately 
reflected in the market. On the other hand, if market anomalies appear, changes in the persistence of earnings and 
accruals occur according to whether non-audit services are provided or not, or the level of the non-audit services 
provided, will not be appropriately reflected in the market. Based on these expectations, in relation to market 
rationality, the following hypotheses (3 and 4) will be set and verified: 
 
H3: Market evaluation of the earnings of the group that is not concurrently provided audit and non-audit services 
(NG), the group that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit services in a few cases (SG), and the group that is 
concurrently provided audit and non-audit services in many cases (LG) should be appropriate. 
 
H4: Market evaluation of the accruals of the group that is not concurrently provided audit and non-audit services (NG), 
the group that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit services in a few cases (SG), and the group that is 
concurrently provided audit and non-audit services in many cases (LG) should be appropriate.  
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 Research Models 
 
3.1.1 Non-Audit Services Group and Earnings and Accruals Persistence 
 
A model to verify differences in earnings persistence between the group that is concurrently provided audit and non-
audit services can be seen in Equation (1). Equation (2) is a model to verify differences in accruals persistence between 
the group that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit services in which the continuing income in period t, which 
is an explanatory variable in Equation (1), is subdivided into accruals and operating cash flows.  
 𝐸"#$ = 	𝛼( + 𝛼$𝐸" + 𝛼*𝑆𝐺 + 𝛼-𝐿𝐺 + 𝛼/𝐸"×𝑆𝐺 + 𝛼1𝐸"×𝐿𝐺 + 𝛼2𝑀𝑉𝐸" + 𝛼5𝐿𝐸𝑉" + 𝛽7𝐵𝑀" +𝛽9𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴" + 𝛽$(𝐸𝑃" + 𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝑌𝐷 + 𝜀"			 (1) 
 	𝐸"#$ = 𝛼( + 𝛼$𝐴𝐶𝐶" + 𝛼*𝑆𝐺 + 𝛼-𝐿𝐺 + 𝛼/𝐴𝐶𝐶"×𝑆𝐺 + 𝛼1𝐴𝐶𝐶"×𝐿𝐺 + 𝛼2𝐶𝐹𝑂" + 𝛼5𝑀𝑉𝐸" +𝛼7𝐿𝐸𝑉" + 𝛽9𝐵𝑀" + 𝛽$(𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴" + 𝛽$$𝐸𝑃" + 𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝑌𝐷 + 𝜀" (2) 
 
Where, 
 
Et Continuing income deflated by lagged total assets; 
SG 
1 if the ratio(non-audit fees / audit fees) in a sample that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit 
services is smaller than the industrial-yearly median, if not, 0; 
LG 
1 if the ratio (non-audit fee s /audit fees) in a sample that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit 
services is larger than the industrial-yearly median, if not, 0; 
ACCt (continuing income – operating cash flow) deflated by lagged total assets; 
CFOt Operating cash flow deflated by lagged total assets; 
MVEt The natural logarithm of total market value; 
LEVt Total debt divided by total assets; 
BMt Total book value divided by total market value; 
BETAt The systematic risk (3 years) estimated by the market model; 
EPt Continuing income divided by total market value; 
IND Industry dummy 
YD Year dummy 
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Among the variables in Equation (1) and Equation (2), SG represents the group that is concurrently provided audit 
and non-audit services in a few cases, and is set as 1 in the case of samples in the group that is concurrently provided 
audit and non-audit services with a ratio (non-audit fees/audit fees) lower than the industrial yearly median, and is set 
as 0 in the case of other samples. LG represents the group that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit services 
in many cases, and is set as 1 in the case of samples in the group that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit 
services with a ratio (non-audit fees/audit fees) higher than the industrial yearly median, and is set as 0 in the case of 
other samples. E×SG and ACC×SG in Equations (1) and (2) refer to differences in the persistence of earnings and 
accruals between the group that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit services in a few cases and the group 
that is not concurrently provided audit and non-audit services, and E×LG and ACC×LG refer to differences in the 
persistence of earnings and accruals between the group that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit services in 
many cases and the group that is not concurrently provided audit and non-audit services.  
 
If differences in the persistence of earnings and accruals occur between the group that is concurrently provided non-
audit services and the group that is not concurrently provided audit and non-audit services, the regression coefficients 
of E×SG, E×LG, ACC×SG and ACC×LG should have significant values. If the self-audit risk view is valid, the 
persistence of earnings and accruals of the group that is concurrently provided non-audit services should be lower than 
that of the group that is not concurrently provided audit and non-audit services, so that the regression coefficients of 
interaction variables should have negative (-) values. On the other hand, if the view of the knowledge transfer 
phenomena is valid, the persistence of earnings and accruals of the group that is concurrently provided non-audit 
services should be higher than that of the group that is not concurrently provided audit and non-audit services, so that 
the regression coefficients of interaction variables should have positive (+) values.  
 
Earnings persistence model control variables are as follows. MVE was included to control business scales, and LEV 
was included to control business capital structures. BM and BETA (systemic risk) were included in the model to 
control the effect of company risk on the persistence of earnings and accruals, and EP was included to control earnings-
price abnormalities. YD (year dummies) and IND (industry dummies) were included in the model to control the effects 
of years and industries on the persistence of earnings and accruals. 
 
3.1.2 Non-Audit Services Group and Market Pricing 
 
To verify market rationality for earnings by the group that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit services, the 
rates of return of hedge portfolios are examined through yearly regression analysis. A model to verify market 
rationality for earnings by the group that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit services can be seen in Equation 
(3) below, which is a model of portfolio priorities for future rates of return, earnings, and other control elements. 
Equation (4) is a model for verification of market rationality for accruals by the group that is concurrently provided 
audit and non-audit services, subdividing the continuing income in period t, which is an explanatory variable in 
Equation (3), into accruals and operating cash flows. 
 𝑆𝐴𝑅"#$ = 	𝛽( + 𝛽$𝐸"FGH + 𝛽*𝑀𝑉𝐸"FGH + 𝛽-𝐵𝑀"FGH + 𝛽/𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴"FGH + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃"FGH + 𝛽2𝑆𝐴𝑅"FGH + 𝜀" (3) 
 𝑆𝐴𝑅"#$ = 	𝛽( + 𝛽$𝐴𝐶𝐶"FGH + 𝛽*𝐶𝐹𝑂"FGH + 𝛼-𝑀𝑉𝐸"FGH + 𝛼/𝐵𝑀"FGH + 𝛼1𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴"FGH + 𝛼2𝐸𝑃"FGH +𝛼5𝑆𝐴𝑅"FGH 	+ 𝜀" (4) 
 
Where, 
 
Et 
Decile group (value obtained by dividing values in a range of 0~9 by 9) of (continuing income / lagged 
total asset); 
ACCt 
Decile group (value obtained by dividing values in a range of 0~9 by 9)of [(continuing income-operating 
cash flow) / lagged total asset]; 
CFOt 
Decile group (value obtained by dividing values in a range of 0~9 by 9) of (operating cash flow / lagged 
total asset); 
SARt Decile group (value obtained by dividing values in a range of 0~9 by 9) of (size-adjusted returns); 
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MVEt Decile group (value obtained by dividing values in a range of 0~9 by 9) of (log value of market value); 
LEVt Decile group (value obtained by dividing values in a range of 0~9 by 9) of (liability total/asset total); 
BMt Decile grou p(value obtained by dividing values in a range of 0~9 by 9) of (capital total/ market value); 
BETAt 
Decile group (value obtained by dividing values in a range of 0~9 by 9) of (three year estimated beta 
using a market model); 
EPt 
Decile group (value obtained by dividing values in a range of 0~9 by 9) of (continuing income/ market 
value); 
 
A dependent variable in Equations (3) and (4) is size-adjusted returns in period t+1 and all explanatory variables are 
divided by 9 after identifying the decile to be set to maintain values in the range of 0~1. The regression coefficients 
of the converted variables represent the rates of return of zero investment portfolios made by buying groups with 
relatively high values of individual variables and selling groups with relatively low values of individual variables. The 
regression coefficient of Edec in Equation (3) represents the non-expected rate of return of the zero investment portfolio 
based on profit information, and ACCdec represents the non-expected rate of return of the zero investment portfolio 
based on accrual information3. If the persistence of earnings and accruals is overestimated in the market, the regression 
coefficients of Edec and ACCdec should have negative (-) values. On the other hand, if the persistence of earnings and 
accruals is appropriately evaluated according to the efficient market hypothesis, the regression coefficients of Edec and 
ACCdec should not be significant. 
 
Market rationality model's control variables are as follows. MVE was included to control business scales. BM and 
BETA (systemic risk) were included in the model to control variation in the future returns due to risk. EP was included 
as a control variable to control earnings-price abnormalities and SAR was included to control the trend of short-term 
returns. 
 
3.2 Sample Selection 
 
In this study, samples that satisfy sample selection criteria during the period of 2001-2012, among firms listed on the 
Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) that run non-banking business, were selected. Table 1 presents the sample selection 
criteria and number of firms excluded before arriving at our final sample. We obtained financial data from KIS-
VALUE, which provides financial statements of all listed firms, and analyst forecasts from the Fn-Guide.  
 
First, financial firms were excluded to secure accounting comparability and samples with no financial data or stock 
price data were excluded. To secure reliability based on audit reports, samples with audit opinions other than 
unqualified opinions were excluded and samples without audit fees were excluded. Consequently, a total of 6,262 
samples were finally selected. Of the final 6,232 samples, 4,131 are those in which the same auditors do not 
concurrently provide audit and non-audit services. The number of samples in which audit and non-audit services are 
concurrently provided is 2,131, the number of samples in which the amount of non-audit service fees was smaller 
compared to audit fees is 1,124, and the number of samples in which the amount of non-audit service fees was larger 
compared to audit fees is 1,007. The financial data of the samples for analysis were winsorized at extreme value 1% 
before being used4. 
 
  
																																								 																				
3 The significance of variables is measured by calculating standard deviations from the distribution of yearly coefficients, according to Fama and 
Macbeth (1973). 
4 The results of analysis after removing extreme values of 1% of the data showed similar values to those of the winsorized empirical results. 
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Table 1. Sample Selection 
Sample Selection Criteria Firm-Year Observations 
Firm-years with December fiscal year-ends and listed on the KSE (2001-2012) 7,704 
(Less) Firm-years with no financial data (704) 
(Less) Firm-years with no stock price (701) 
(Less) Firm-years with audit opinions other than unqualified opinions (28) 
(Less) Firm-years without audit fees (9) 
Total 6,262 
Final Sample 
The group that is not concurrently provided audit and non-audit services (NG) 4,131 
The group that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit services in a few 
cases  (SG) 1,124 
The group that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit services in a many 
cases  (LG) 1,007 
 
4. EMPRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of major variables and the results of verification of the average differences 
between non-audit service groups. In PANEL A, the averages of continuing incomes in period t and those in period 
t+1 are shown to be 0.037 and 0.040, respectively, and this can be interpreted as increases on average in the continuing 
incomes of stock-listed corporations. Whereas the averages of continuing incomes are shown as positive (+) values, 
the average of accruals is shown as –0.02, a negative (-) value. Dechow (1994) and Ko and Yun (2006) mention that 
total accruals have negative (-) values because of non-current accruals such as depreciation, and the same phenomenon 
was identified in the samples of this study.   
 
Panel B shows average differences in major variables among the group that is not concurrently provided audit and 
non-audit services, the group that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit services in a few cases, and the group 
that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit services in many cases. Whereas size-adjusted returns in period t+1 
are shown to not be different among the groups, continuing incomes, accruals, and operating cash flows are shown to 
be different among the groups.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Differences Among Groups 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Min Median Max 
Et+1 6,262 0.040 0.087 -0.305 0.039 0.305 
SARt+1 6,262 -0.027 0.493 -1.156 -0.098 1.940 
Et 6,262 0.037 0.083 -0.303 0.038 0.278 
ACC 6,262 -0.020 0.089 -0.324 -0.019 0.251 
CFO 6,262 0.052 0.081 -0.199 0.050 0.286 
MVE 6,262 25.516 1.767 22.492 25.187 30.409 
LEV 6,262 0.448 0.194 0.059 0.452 0.936 
BM 6,262 1.761 1.359 0.123 1.394 7.233 
BETA 6,262 0.892 0.521 -1.773 0.870 3.585 
EP 6,262 0.035 0.338 -2.008 0.082 0.755 
SARt 6,262 -0.027 0.538 -1.364 -0.101 2.146 
(Table 2 continued on next page) 
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(Table 2 continued) 
Panel B: Differences Among Groups 
Variable NG (n=4,131) SG (n=1,124) LG (n=1,007) ANOVA (F-value) Mean Mean Mean 
Et+1 0.037 0.043 0.047 5.87*** 
SARt+1 -0.026 -0.032 -0.022 0.13 
Et 0.035 0.038 0.045 6.80*** 
ACC -0.018 -0.027 -0.022 4.49** 
CFO 0.048 0.059 0.060 13.92*** 
1) Variables definitions. 
E: Continuing operations income deflated by lagged total assets; 
SAR: The size adjusted return cumulated over a 12-month period; 
ACC: Accruals measured as (continuing income – operating cash flow) deflated by lagged total assets; 
CFO: Operating cash flow deflated by lagged total assets; 
MVE: The natural logarithm of total market value; 
LEV: Total debt divided by total assets; 
BM: Total book value divided by total market value; 
BETA: The systematic risk (3 years) estimated by the market model; 
EP: Continuing operations income divided by total market value; 
NG: The group that is not concurrently provided audit and non-audit services; 
SG: The group that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit services in a few cases; 
LG: The group that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit services in a many cases; 
2) *,**,*** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Table 3 below shows the results of correlations among variables in the 6,262 sample businesses from 2001 to 2012. 
Continuing incomes and operating cash flows in period t are shown to have positive (+) correlations and accruals and 
operating cash flows are shown to have negative (-) correlations. These results are the same as those of Dechow (1994) 
and Ko and Gwon (2006). The continuing incomes, accruals, and operating cash flows are shown to be larger in larger 
businesses indicating that larger businesses are more profitable. Businesses with higher debt ratios are shown to have 
smaller continuing incomes, accruals, and operating cash flows. This is interpreted to be attributable to interest costs, 
which are the costs of debts. Businesses with higher BM and BETA, which indicate company risk, are shown to have 
lower profitability. Businesses with larger continuing incomes are shown to have higher earnings-price ratios, 
indicating that businesses with larger continuing incomes are more underestimated in the market. 
 
Table 3. Correlations among the Variables 
 Et+1 SARt+1 Et ACC CFO MVE LEV BM BETA EP 
SARt+1 0.198          
Et 0.534 0.024         
ACC 0.042 -0.042 0.451        
CFO 0.440 0.065 0.464 -0.532       
MVE 0.235 -0.038 0.296 0.021 0.237      
LEV -0.219 -0.012 -0.334 -0.157 -0.165 -0.067     
BM -0.167 0.098 -0.156 0.023 -0.129 -0.460 -0.035    
BETA -0.095 -0.021 -0.091 0.022 -0.107 0.139 0.165 -0.074   
EP 0.258 0.037 0.701 0.429 0.251 0.111 -0.286 0.009 -0.085  
SARt 0.218 0.011 0.203 0.063 0.127 0.079 -0.027 -0.095 -0.016 0.177 
1) Please see <Table 2> for variable definitions 
2) This table presents Pearson correlations. Coefficients shown in bold are significant at p < 0.05 (two-tailed test). 
 
4.2 Multivariate Results 
 
4.2.1 Non-Audit Services Group and Earnings and Accruals Persistence 
 
Table 4 shows the results of regression analysis of the persistence of earnings and accruals by the non-audit services 
group. According to PANEL A, the earnings persistence regression coefficient of the group that is not concurrently 
provided audit and non-audit services is 0.650, that of the group that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit 
services in a few cases is 0.782, and that of the group that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit services in 
many cases is 0.520, and the differences between the values are shown to be significant at a 1% significance level. 
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Compared to the group that is not concurrently provided audit and non-audit services, the group that is concurrently 
provided audit and non-audit services in a few cases is shown to have slightly higher earnings persistence, and the 
difference is shown to be significant at a 10% significance level. Compared to the group that is not concurrently 
provided audit and non-audit services, the group that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit services in many 
cases is shown to have lower earnings persistence, but the difference is shown to not be significant.  
 
According to Panel B, the accruals persistence regression coefficients of the group that is not concurrently provided 
audit and non-audit services, the group that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit services in a few cases, and 
the group that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit services in many cases are shown to be 0.471, 0.528, and 
0.240, respectively, and the differences between the values are shown to be significant at a 1% significance level. 
Compared to the group that is not concurrently provided audit and non-audit services, the group that is concurrently 
provided audit and non-audit services in a few cases is shown to have higher accruals persistence, but the difference 
is shown to not be significant. Compared to the group that is not concurrently provided audit and non-audit services, 
the group that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit services in many cases is shown to have lower accruals 
persistence, and the differences between the values are shown to be significant at a 1% significance level. 
 
Table 4. The Persistence of Earnings and Accruals of Non-Audit Services Group 
Panel A: The Persistence of Earnings of Non-Audit Services Group 
Variable NG (n=4,131) SG (n=1,124) LG (n=1,007) Full Sample(n=6,262) Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Intercept -0.091 -3.59*** 0.010 0.26 -0.048 -1.13 -0.064 -3.53*** 
E 0.650 30.64*** 0.782 22.56*** 0.520 14.07*** 0.640 34.08*** 
SG       -0.002 -0.63 
LG       -0.001 -0.35 
E×SG       0.055 1.90* 
E×LG       -0.018 -0.6 
MVE 0.005 4.8*** 0.002 1.19 0.004 3.19*** 0.004 5.77*** 
LEV -0.035 -5.26*** -0.029  -2.49** -0.073 -5.12*** -0.033 -6.24*** 
BM -0.008 -8.4*** -0.003 -2.02** -0.011 -5.26*** -0.006 -7.23*** 
BETA -0.009 -4.06*** 0.002 0.41 -0.014 -3.1*** -0.008 -4.53*** 
EP -0.055 -11.66*** -0.080 -9.08*** -0.029 -3.05*** -0.055 -14.38*** 
Industry and 
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included 
Adj. R2 0.32 0.45 0.37 0.35 
Panel B: The Persistence of Accruals of Non-Audit Services Group 
Variable NG (n=4,131) SG (n=1,124) LG (n=1,007) Full Sample(n=6,262) Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Intercept -0.060 -2.37** 0.035 0.87 -0.027 -0.62 -0.032 -1.74* 
ACC 0.471 21.97*** 0.528 13.53*** 0.240 6.09*** 0.452 24.59*** 
SG       0.000 0.08 
LG       -0.003 -0.96 
ACC×SG       0.021 0.77 
ACC×LG       -0.072 -2.61*** 
CFO 0.729 31.58*** 0.802 20.16*** 0.539 12.59*** 0.713 39.6*** 
MVE 0.003 3.26*** 0.001 0.6 0.004 2.45** 0.002 3.57*** 
LEV -0.032 -4.89*** -0.027 -2.28** -0.074 -5.15*** -0.037 -6.99*** 
BM -0.008 -8.98*** -0.006 -3.25*** -0.012 -6.13*** -0.009 -11.4*** 
BETA -0.009 -3.82*** 0.002 0.54 -0.014 -3.04*** -0.008 -4.29*** 
EP -0.040 -8.59*** -0.045 -4.96*** -0.003 -0.35 -0.035 -9.24*** 
Industry and 
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included 
Adj. R2 0.33 0.45 0.37 0.35 
1) Please see Table 2 for variable definitions. 2) SG: 1 if the ratio (non-audit fees/audit fees) in a sample that is currently provided audit and non-
audit services is smaller than the industrial-yearly median, if not, 0; LG: 1 if the ratio (non-audit fees/audit fees) in a sample that is currently 
provided audit and non-audit services is larger than the industrial-yearly median, if not, 0; 3) *,**,*** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 shows the results of the analysis of differences in earnings persistence according to whether audit and non-
audit services are concurrently provided or not, and differences in earnings persistence according to the level of 
concurrent provision of audit and non-audit services. According to Panel A, whether audit and non-audit services are 
concurrently provided or not do not affect earnings persistence or accruals persistence. On the other hand, according 
to the results of the analysis of differences in the persistence of earnings and accruals between the group that is 
concurrently provided audit and non-audit services in a few cases and the group that is concurrently provided audit 
and non-audit services in many cases, the group that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit services in many 
cases is shown to have a lower persistence of earnings and accruals than the other group. As mentioned earlier, this 
suggests that whether audit and non-audit services are concurrently provided or not do not greatly affect auditor 
independence, and that a phenomenon of great damage to auditor independence appears in the group that is 
concurrently provided audit and non-audit services in many cases.  
 
Table 5. The Differences in Earnings and Accruals Persistence according to whether Non-Audit Services are provided or not and 
the Level of Non-Audit Services 
Panel A: The Differences in Earnings and Accruals Persistence according to whether Non-Audit Services are provided or not 
Variable Coefficient t-value Variables Coefficient t-value 
Intercept -0.058 -3.16*** Intercept -0.032 -1.72* 
E 0.646 34.72*** ACC 0.449 23.29*** 
NF -0.001 -0.51 CFO 0.710 33.99*** 
E×NF 0.020 0.88 NF -0.002 -0.68 
   ACC×NF -0.021 -0.83 
   ACC×NF 0.008 0.3 
Controls, Industry 
And Year Dummy Included 
Controls, Industry 
And Year Dummy Included 
N 6,262 N 6,262 
Adj. R2 0.35 Adj. R2 0.35 
 
Panel B: The Differences in Earnings and Accruals Persistence according to the Level of Non-Audit Services 
Variable Coefficient t-value Variables Coefficient t-value 
Intercept -0.013 -0.45 Intercept 0.010 0.36 
E 0.691 22.36*** ACC 0.453 13.00 
LG 0.001 0.33 CFO 0.722 19.79*** 
E×LG -0.071 -1.98** LG 0.001 0.04 
   ACC×LG -0.133 -3.23*** 
   ACC×LG -0.082 -1.88*** 
Controls, Industry 
And Year Dummy Included 
Controls, Industry 
And Year Dummy Included 
N 2,131 N 2,131 
Adj. R2 0.40 Adj. R2 0.40 
1) Please see Table 2 for variable definitions. 
2) NF: 1 if a sample that is currently provided audit and non-audit services, if not, 0; 
LG: 1 if the ratio (non-audit fees/audit fees) in a sample that is currently provided audit and non-audit services is larger than the industrial-yearly 
median, if not, 0; 
3) *,**,*** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
4.2.2 Non-Audit Services Group and Market Pricing 
 
Table 6 shows the results of market responses to differences in the predictive values of earnings between the group 
that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit services. To this end, the level of market rationality of the individual 
group that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit services is verified through an estimation of the rates of return 
according to hedge portfolios, based on the methodology of Sloan (1996). To estimate the rates of return according to 
hedge portfolio strategies, regression analyses are conducted year by year, according to Fama-Macbeth (1973).  
 
According to Panel A, the empirical results of the market rationality of earnings indicates that differences in regression 
coefficients of earnings between the group that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit services is not significant. 
This means that if businesses follow investment strategies based on earnings, no significant unexpected return will 
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occur, and that capital market participants appropriately evaluate the earnings persistence of individual group that is 
concurrently provided audit and non-audit services.  
 
Panel B shows the empirical results of the market rationality of accruals of individual group that is concurrently 
provided audit and non-audit services. According to PANEL B, the accruals regression coefficient of the group that 
is concurrently provided audit and non-audit services in many cases is shown to be –0.153 which is significant at a 
10% significance level. This means that accrual abnormalities exist in the case of the group that is concurrently 
provided audit and non-audit services in many cases, and that if this group implements investment strategies using the 
accruals, unexpected returns of approximately 15% can be secured. This indicates that market participants do not 
appropriately analyze the phenomenon of the lower accruals persistence of the group that is concurrently provided 
audit and non-audit services in many cases compared to the other group, and that market participants do not implement 
investment strategies using differences in accruals persistence.  
 
Table 6. The Empirical Results of Market Pricing of Non-Audit Services Group 
Panel A: The Empirical Results of Market Rationality of Earnings 
 NG (n=4,131) SG (n=1,124) LG (n=1,007) 
Variable Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Intercept -0.152 -3.4*** 0.220 -2.54** -0.135 -1.33 
Edec 0.061 0.93 -0.087 -0.71 -0.153 -1.54 
SIZEdec -0.026 -0.45 0.009 0.14 0.006 0.08 
LEVdec 0.210 3.6*** 0.191 3.28*** 0.118 1.6 
BMdec -0.001 -0.02 0.155 1.62 0.180 2.32** 
BETAdec -0.033 -1.38 -0.007 -0.08 -0.041 -0.45 
EPdec 0.039 1.01 0.098 1.01 0.106 2.21** 
Adj. R2 0.05 0.07 0.04 
 
Panel B: The Empirical Results of Market Rationality of Accruals 
 NG (n=4,131) SG (n=1,124) LG (n=1,007) 
Variable Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Intercept -0.163 -3.62*** 0.203 -2.18* -0.091 -0.82 
ACCdec -0.062 -1.05 -0.126 -1.44 -0.153 -2.13* 
CFOdec 0.103 1.94*** 0.043 0.61 -0.050 -0.44 
SIZEdec -0.025 -0.43 -0.024 -0.43 -0.022 -0.23 
LEVdec 0.214 3.88*** 0.236 3.27*** 0.140 2.4** 
BMdec 0.035 0.56 0.120 1.64 0.104 1.39 
BETAdec -0.027 -1.1 -0.001 -0.01 -0.004 -0.05 
EPdec 0.034 0.93 0.077 0.76 0.111 2.23** 
Adj. R2 0.06 0.08 0.05 
1) Please see Table 2 for variable definitions 
2) All explanatory variables are divided by 9 after identifying the decile to be set to behave values in a range of 0~9 
3) *,**,*** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
4.3 Additional analyses 
 
4.3.1 Big Four and Earnings and Accruals Persistence of Non-Audit Services Group 
 
In the case of large-scaled accounting firms (Big Four), since measures to create earnings are diverse and losses due 
to deterioration of the auditor's reputation will be larger than economic losses due to auditor replacement, auditor 
independence can be maintained even if audit and non-audit services are concurrently provided. For this reason, 
DeAngelo (1981) mention large accounting firms as a representative proxy variable for audit quality. In the same 
context, the possibility of damage to independence according to whether non-audit services are provided or not and 
the levels of non-audit services are expected to be lower in the case of large accounting firms than in other firms, and 
no difference in the persistence of profits and accruals is expected in large accounting firms. As the first additional 
analysis, auditors are divided into large accounting firms and other accounting firms, and differences in the earnings 
and accruals persistence according to whether non-audit services are provided or not and the levels of non-audit 
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services are examined. 
Table 7. Big Four and Earnings and Accruals Persistence of Non-Audit Services Group 
Panel A: Big Four and Earnings Persistence of Non-Audit Services Group 
Variable Big Four Non-Big Four Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Intercept -0.012 -0.55 -0.122 -2.97*** 
E 0.621 26.12*** 0.623 19.99*** 
SG -0.003 -1.07 0.001 0.3 
LG -0.002 -0.58 -0.006 -0.93 
E×SG 0.025 0.71 0.107 2.11** 
E×LG 0.020 0.58 -0.162 -2.57** 
Industry and Year Dummy Included Included 
N 3,958 2,304 
Adj. R2 0.39 0.31 
 
 
Panel B: Big Four and Accruals Persistence of Non-Audit Services Group 
Variable Big Four Non-Big Four Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Intercept 0.019 0.9 -0.091 -2.19** 
ACC 0.457 19.02*** 0.420 14.43*** 
SG -0.003 -0.95 0.004 0.91 
LG 0.000 -0.16 -0.016 -2.58** 
ACC×SG 0.008 0.25 0.022 0.44 
ACC×LG -0.038 -1.21 -0.191 -3.47*** 
Industry and Year Dummy Included Included 
N 3,958 2,304 
Adj. R2 0.37 0.32 
1) Please see Table 2 for variable definitions. 
2) SG: 1 if the ratio (non-audit fees/audit fees) in a sample that is currently provided audit and non-audit services is smaller than the industrial-
yearly median, if not, 0; 
LG: 1 if the ratio (non-audit fees/audit fees) in a sample that is currently provided audit and non-audit services is larger than the industrial-yearly 
median, if not, 0; 
3) *,**,*** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Table 7 provides the results of differences in earnings and accruals persistence between the group that is concurrently 
provided audit and non-audit services, according to whether auditor is one of the Big Four or not. In cases where the 
firm is audited by a large accounting firm (Big Four), the earnings and accruals persistence is not different for those 
that are not concurrently provided audit and non-audit services and those that are concurrently provided audit and non-
audit services in a few cases or in many cases. On the other hand, in cases where the firm is not audited by a Big Four, 
those that are concurrently provided audit and non-audit services in many cases show a lower earnings and accruals 
persistence than those that are not concurrently provided audit and non-audit services. Given this, it can be seen that 
the phenomenon of damage to the independence of the auditor following the provision of non-audit services appears 
in cases where the auditor is not a Big Four. On the other hand, in the case of Big Four, since measures to create 
earnings are diverse, and losses due to deterioration of the auditor's reputation will be larger than economic losses due 
to auditor replacement, auditor independence can be maintained even if audit and non-audit services are concurrently 
provided in large scale. 
 
4.3.2 Audit Risk and Earnings and Accruals Persistence of Non-Audit Services Group 
 
In the case of businesses with high audit risk, if auditors neglect managers' opportunistic actions, the risk of accounting 
enforcement actions may increase. Since economic losses will be incurred due to class actions and auditor replacement 
if accounting enforcement actions occur, even in cases where non-audit services have been provided, the auditor 
should perform the audit considering risk following audit failure. Therefore, auditor independence is expected to be 
maintained even in cases where non-audit services have been provided in the case of groups with high audit risk, and 
the phenomenon of damage to the independence of the auditor is expected to occur in group with low audit risk. Based 
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on these expectations, in this section, differences in earnings persistence between the group that is concurrently 
provided audit and non-audit services according to the level of audit risk will be examined. To this end, group with 
high audit risk are set as those group where the absolute value of discretionary accruals is higher than the industrial 
yearly median5. 
 
Table 8. Audit Risk and Earnings and Accruals Persistence of Non-Audit Services Group 
Panel A: Audit Risk and Earnings Persistence of Non-Audit Services Group 
Variable High Audit Risk Low Audit Risk Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Intercept -0.071 -2.35** -0.047 -2.25** 
E 0.561 21.55*** 0.815 29.22*** 
SG 0.000 0.03 -0.003 -0.97 
LG -0.004 -1 0.005 1.36 
E×SG 0.039 1.02 0.086 1.94** 
E×LG 0.007 0.17 -0.090 -2.04** 
Controls, Industry And Year 
Dummy Included Included 
N 3,068 3,194 
Adj. R2 0.31 0.44 
 
Panel B: Audit Risk and Accruals Persistence of Non-Audit Services Group 
Variable High Audit Risk Low Audit Risk Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Intercept -0.027 -0.88 -0.031 -1.42 
ACC 0.399 16.55*** 0.649 18.8*** 
SG 0.001 0.31 0.001 0.47 
LG -0.005 -1.23 -0.003 -0.96 
ACC×SG 0.018 0.53 0.071 1.16 
ACC×LG -0.029 -0.85 -0.299 -5.32*** 
Controls, Industry And Year 
Dummy Included Included 
N 3,068 3,194 
Adj. R2 0.31 0.42 
1) Please see Table 2 for variable definitions. 
2) SG: 1 if the ratio (non-audit fees/audit fees) in a sample that is currently provided audit and non-audit services is smaller than the industrial-
yearly median, if not, 0; 
LG: 1 if the ratio (non-audit fees/audit fees) in a sample that is currently provided audit and non-audit services is larger than the industrial-yearly 
median, if not, 0; 
3) *,**,*** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively 
 
The results of analysis of differences in earnings persistence between the group that is concurrently provided audit 
and non-audit services according to the level of audit risk are presented in Table 8. According to the results, in the 
case of group with high audit risk, the persistence of profits and accruals of the group that is concurrently provided 
audit and non-audit services in a few cases or in many cases is not different from that of the group that is not 
concurrently provide audit and non-audit services. On the other hand, in the case of group with low audit risk, the 
persistence of profits and accruals of the group that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit services in many 
cases is lower than that of the group that is not concurrently provide audit and non-audit services. This means that in 
the case of businesses with high audit risk, auditor independence is maintained even in the case of the group that 
concurrently provided audit and non-audit services in many cases, because economic losses following audit failure 
are larger than losses due to auditor replacement. This also suggests that the phenomenon of damage to the 
independence of the group that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit services in many cases occurs in group 
																																								 																				
5 Discretionary accruals are estimated according to the performance-matched modified Jones model proposed by Kothari et al. (2005). The 
estimation formula is as follows:  
TAit/Ait-1 = a0 (1/Ait-1) + a1[(△Sales-△AR)it/Ait-1)]+ a2 (PPEit/Ait-1) +a3 ROAit + et  
where TAt: total accruals (net income – operating cash flow); Salesit: sales; ARit: account receivables; Ait-1: total assets in the immediately preceding 
year; PPEit: tangible assets; ROAit: net income/underlying total assets 
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with a low possibility of audit failure, that is, group with low audit risk. 
Based on the results in Table 8 analyzed earlier, it can be expected that differences in earnings persistence may occur 
between the group that is concurrently provided non-audit services, depending on whether the auditor is a Big Four 
or not, as well as the level of audit risk. Causes that make differences between the group can be considered to be the 
possibility of economic losses following deteriorated auditor reputation and the possibility of audit failure risk. To 
determine a more important cause between the two cases, analyses by group were conducted according to whether the 
auditor is a Big Four and the level of audit risk.  
 
According to the results shown in Table 9, in the case of group with high audit risk, differences in the persistence of 
profits and accruals did not appear in both Big Four and Non-Big Four. On the other hand, in the case of group with 
low audit risk, the phenomenon of declines in accruals persistence in group that is concurrently provided audit and 
non-audit services in many cases occurs regardless of whether the group is a Big Four or not. This suggests that 
auditors consider losses following audit failure such as those due to class actions to be more important than losses due 
to the deterioration of auditor reputation. 
 
Table 9. Audit Risk, Big Four and Earnings and Accruals Persistence of Non-Audit Services Group 
Panel A: Earnings Persistence of Non-Audit Services Group 
Variable 
High Audit Risk Low Audit Risk 
Big Four Non-Big Four Big Four Non-Big Four 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Intercept -0.024 -0.69 -0.079 -1.19 -0.003 -0.13 -0.152 -3.19*** 
E 0.537 15.88*** 0.561 13.34*** 0.788 23.19*** 0.808 16.56*** 
SG -0.002 -0.49 0.004 0.57 -0.002 -0.59 -0.003 -0.56 
LG -0.001 -0.25 -0.018 -1.92* -0.003 -0.78 0.021 2.66*** 
E×SG 0.040 0.86 0.036 0.52 0.015 0.28 0.202 2.65*** 
E×LG -0.018 -0.38 0.029 0.35 0.056 1.16 -0.749 -7.19*** 
Controls, Industry 
And Year Dummy Included Included Included Included 
N 1,889 1,179 2,069 1,125 
Adj. R2 0.34 0.27 0.47 0.42 
 
Panel B: Accruals Persistence of Non-Audit Services Group 
Variable 
High Audit Risk Low Audit Risk 
Big Four Non-Big Four Big Four Non-Big Four 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Intercept 0.033 0.93 -0.087 -1.29 -0.005 -0.18 -0.057 -1.16 
ACC 0.391 12.21*** 0.383 10.14*** 0.637 14.2*** 0.646 11.56*** 
SG -0.001 -0.19 0.004 0.53 -0.001 -0.22 0.005 0.83 
LG -0.002 -0.35 -0.023 -2.52** -0.001 -0.23 -0.017 -2.14** 
ACC×SG -0.005 -0.11 0.013 0.21 0.087 1.22 0.103 0.88 
ACC×LG -0.016 -0.4 -0.101 -1.5 -0.127 -1.99** -0.737 -6.25*** 
Controls, Industry 
And Year Dummy Included Included Included Included 
N 1,889 1,179 2,069 1,125 
Adj. R2 0.33 0.29 0.45 0.37 
1) Please see Table 2 for variable definitions. 
2) SG: 1 if the ratio (non-audit fees/audit fees) in a sample that is currently provided audit and non-audit services is smaller than the industrial-
yearly median, if not, 0; 
LG: 1 if the ratio (non-audit fees/audit fees) in a sample that is currently provided audit and non-audit services is larger than the industrial-yearly 
median, if not, 0; 
3) *,**,*** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, based on two conflicting views of the relationship between the concurrent provision of audit and non-
audit services and auditor independence, the relationship between the concurrent provision and auditor independence 
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was examined from the viewpoint of earnings persistence, and market responses to the relationship were reviewed.  
Empirical results are as follows. First, the accruals persistence of the group that is concurrently provided audit and 
non-audit services in many cases is shown to be lower than that of the group that is not concurrently provided audit 
and non-audit services. Second, the phenomenon of low accruals persistence of the group that is concurrently provided 
audit and non-audit services is shown to be overestimated in the market. Through additional analysis, differences in 
the persistence of earnings and accruals between the group that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit services, 
according to whether the auditor is a Big Four and the level of audit risk, are analyzed, and differences in the 
persistence of earnings and accruals between the group that is concurrently provided audit and non-audit services are 
not observed in the case of a Big Four in which losses due to the deterioration of auditor reputation are large and in 
cases where losses due to audit failure are large. 
 
This study contributes to the existing research in three main respects. First, from the viewpoint of earnings persistence, 
it is verified that rather than whether non-audit services are provided or not, the level of non-audit services acts as an 
important factor for determining damage to auditor independence by concurrent provision of audit and non-audit 
services. Second, in relation to market rationality, whether the market appropriately reflects changes in the persistence 
of earnings and accruals according to whether non-audit services are provided or not is analyzed. Third, through 
addition analysis, it is verified that differences in the persistence of earnings and accruals among groups that are 
concurrently provide audit and non-audit services vary with audit environments. Finally, our study is expected to 
provide additional information at this point in time where consentaneous study results regarding the damage to the 
independence of the auditor and knowledge transfer phenomena following concurrent provision of audit and non-audit 
services have not been reported.  
 
Limitations of our study are that different types of non-audit services could not be separately analyzed due to 
limitations in the acquisition of data, and that although accruals were used as a proxy for the independence of the 
auditor, the validity of this can still be questioned. 
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